

7

The Dutch Case: The Kingdom of Holland and the Imperial Departments

Matthijs Lok and Martijn van der Burg

A forgotten period

The Napoleonic era is traditionally not a very popular epoch in Dutch historiography. Most older studies have treated the period of Incorporation into the Empire in 1810 as only a prelude to the establishment of the Orange Monarchy in 1813. Indeed, there is still no general monograph on the Incorporation (*Inlijving*) of the Dutch provinces. The reasons for this neglect are twofold. Firstly, the Napoleonic period has been perceived as one of national decline; political independence was under threat and finally lost entirely in 1810. Instead of returning to the glories of the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic, the economy shrank, cities depopulated and young men were conscripted for the Napoleonic army. Indeed, immediately after the collapse of the Empire in the Dutch departments in October 1813, many pamphlets were published describing the atrocities committed by the French. Secondly, and probably more damaging for the Dutch remembrance of Napoleonic rule, was the official policy of forgetting by King William I (r. 1813–40). According to this policy of *oubli*, the Napoleonic period was simply not to be mentioned, whether positively or negatively. Thus, the years 1795–1813 were draped in silence during the Restoration.¹

Dutch historians are not solely to blame for this lack of interest. The Dutch case is also often neglected in general surveys. Even Simon Schama has placed most emphasis on the revolutionary years and sees the Napoleonic period only as the aftermath of conflicts of the Revolutionary period.² Dutch researchers have only now begun to show interest in the Napoleonic period. As a result new insights are emerging, partly from fresh archival research, partly under the influence of new concepts being applied to Napoleonic studies. We think that the Napoleonic Netherlands should no longer be studied from an exclusively national point of view, but from a European perspective, as Michael Broers suggested in his introduction to this volume, and that new insights will be gained from making comparisons with other European countries and regions under Napoleonic rule. It has become clear that Napoleonic control

was not as absolute as has been portrayed, and in many subject states the French took a pragmatic approach to incorporating annexed lands into the Empire.³

In this chapter we will examine the extent to which pre-Revolutionary Dutch institutions and elites survived or re-emerged as a result of Napoleonic rule. The years 1799–1814 are marked by a series of regime changes and each of these regimes had their own characters and specific problems. The question of whether Napoleonic rule represented a revived old order or a new regime will be examined for each regime, in turn, but it is not easily answered.

The Regency of State (1801–05): the politics of *fusion*

In 1795 French troops overthrew the old federal Dutch Republic and Orange Stadholderate and engineered the Batavian Revolution. With French support, a coup d'état was staged in 1798 by radical Batavian revolutionaries, resulting in the Constitution of 1798, which turned the Netherlands into a unitary state for the first time. This first Dutch constitution closely resembled its French counterpart of 1795, which ushered in the Directory, although in many respects it also drew on earlier Batavian drafts, as well as the American Constitution.⁴ By 1801, however, the French Consulate sought an end to the revolution it had helped to create six years before. The French envoy, Sémonville, and his master Talleyrand, the Foreign Minister, now saw the constitution of 1798 as a disreputable relic of radical republicanism. In accordance with Napoleon's policy of *fusion* within France itself, Sémonville supported the rapprochement between moderate revolutionaries and supporters of the House of Orange, who had been excluded from office after the 1795 Revolution.⁵ French calls to reform the Batavian constitution coincided with a general climate of disillusionment with the Revolution in the Netherlands. Eminent revolutionaries were disappointed with the results of the 1798 constitution and felt that reform was needed in order to implement a truly revolutionary programme. According to some radical revolutionaries, the Constitution had been too quick to discard the old provinces, the pillars of the pre-Revolutionary Dutch Republic, while the growing popularity of the ideas of Montesquieu gave the old provinces a renewed role as intermediate bodies that formed barriers against state despotism.⁶

However, the attempts by the Directors in September 1801 to replace the radical constitution with a new one modelled on the Napoleonic constitution of the Year VIII/1799 met with resistance in the representative assembly, which, in turn, provoked a Caesarian solution to the problem of reform. On 18 September, French troops sealed the doors of the legislative assembly and its proceedings were terminated. A new constitution, establishing the *Staatsbewind* (Regency of State) was proclaimed. It was not nearly as

groundbreaking as the first Dutch constitution of 1798, but it promised the stable administration that a large part of the population hoped for. The 1801 Constitution was indeed more moderate than its predecessor and aimed at political reconciliation. In this new constitutional order, political participation by large sections of the population diminished, just as in the French Napoleonic constitution of 1799.

The constitution of 1801 also implied a partial return to pre-revolutionary institutions. The pre-revolutionary frontiers of the old provinces were restored and the eight ancien régime provinces, as well as the great cities, received more powers at the expense of the central government. Importantly, instead of concentrating all executive powers in the hands of one figure, as in France, the French and Dutch agreed that the Netherlands needed a collegiate administration. Thus, collegial government, the hallmark of the administration of the old Republic, was restored. In this spirit, the Batavian Republic was renamed the Batavian Commonwealth, to give it a less revolutionary flavour, and the symbolism of the old régime gradually reappeared.

Along with the symbolism and the institutions, the old régime elites also started to re-emerge. Henceforth, the vacancies in the legislative assembly were filled according to provincial quotas just as under the ancien régime. Moderate patriots like the Amsterdam regent, Jan Bicker, were appointed in this way, as well as staunch Orangists, who had been excluded after the Revolution. Thus, old enemies who had fought during the ancien régime, now formed a united front against a new common enemy, radical revolutionary republicanism and, in this way, Napoleonic rule ended centuries-old conflicts within the Dutch elite. The reconciliation of moderate patriots and Orangists was facilitated by the fact that the last Stadholder, William V, had given up his claims to the Netherlands in exchange for a financial indemnity. For his cooperative attitude, Napoleon awarded William's son, the future King William I, the government of Fulda and Corvey, in Germany. Just as in Napoleonic France, the Dutch governing elite was no longer selected for its ideological purity, but according to social standing and wealth.

Despite appearances, the Regency of State was not a real return to the past, but the start of something new. First, it meant another step in the process of Dutch state formation. While the régime was supposed to be less centralist than the previous administrations, in reality the government managed to get a firm grip on local and provincial administration. It initiated important new policies hitherto considered impossible to implement. Above all, provincial finances, primary education and the creation of new cultural institutions could at last be dealt with on a national level. As a result, the bureaucracy in The Hague grew considerably, whereas one would have expected a decreasing civil service in the process of federalization.⁷ Second, the Regency of State was the first attempt to find a middle way

between the old regime and the revolution. A new policy of national unity was proclaimed from which only radicals of the extreme left and right were excluded. What resulted was the Dutch corollary of the Napoleonic policy of *fusion*, the dominant presence of moderate revolutionaries and Orangists within the new government. Successor regimes continued this striving for national reconciliation and the search for a compromise between the old order and new regime. From 1801 onwards the middle way would form a central theme in Dutch political culture.

Schimmelpenninck (1805–06): a presidential government

The moderate Staatsbewind did not prove the stable ally Napoleon hoped for. Although the need for a national figurehead had been questioned by the Dutch, discussions on the necessity of a stronger executive authority kept resurfacing in the years following 1801. Napoleon criticized this lack of a strong executive authority, and wanted to impose a head of state on the Batavian Republic. Consequently, Talleyrand and Napoleon asked Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, the Batavian ambassador in Paris, to draw up a new constitutional framework for the Netherlands. A plebiscite was then staged, and the Staatsbewind was pushed aside. Schimmelpenninck's new constitution restored the unitary state without its radical revolutionary ideology. The new constitution was considerably shorter than its predecessor of 1801, notably curbing the civic and political rights of citizens. Schimmelpenninck became *Raadpensionaris*, Grand Pensionary, of the Batavian Republic, a term that used to designate the highest post within the province of Holland. This archaic title was insisted on by the French, whereas Schimmelpenninck, an admirer of the American model, actually preferred the title President of the Batavian Republic.⁸ Most surprisingly, Schimmelpenninck, who in his youth had been an advocate of popular sovereignty, reduced the power of the legislature to a minimum.⁹ During his one-year presidency, Schimmelpenninck was reasonably successful. He appointed a number of excellent men who managed to complete the initiatives of the Staatsbewind. In place of provincial excise taxes, the Minister of Finance, Isaac Gogel, introduced a progressive income tax, while Adriaan van den Ende completed the new legislation on primary education, which was far ahead of its time.¹⁰

However, Napoleon continued to be troubled by the instability of the Batavian regime, which he attributed to its political organization and the weakness of the Grand Pensionary. He felt that only a monarchy could prevent either the country succumbing to British pressure, or the Dutch continuing to long for a return to the old regime.¹¹ The conversion of the country into a kingdom was unconstitutional and undemocratic, and therefore impossible, according to the well-known jurist Joan Melchior Kemper. He stressed the need to hold a referendum, but at the same time feared the 'apathetic' Dutch would stay at home.¹² When Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck

sent his diplomatic delegation to Paris for talks with Napoleon in spring 1806, he also impressed upon the diplomats that a hereditary head of state was incompatible with the Batavian national character.¹³

The Kingdom of Holland (1806–10): a monarchical experiment

On 5 June 1806 the Batavian Republic and the French Empire signed the Treaty of Paris and Louis Bonaparte was created King of Holland. Napoleon gave his brother an ambiguous job description, which placed Louis in an unfavourable position from the outset; the Emperor had simply placed Louis at the head of the Batavian Republic without working out this dramatic constitutional change in detail. This produced half-hearted results. Seemingly, the Kingdom of Holland was a *fait accompli*, but the Batavian Republic remained hidden under the surface as its political reality. Unhappy with this situation, Louis began to give real shape to his kingship. He considered constitutional monarchy the form of government best suited to coping with the political difficulties that had plagued the country for decades. Louis's words made reference to the general desire of the Dutch for harmony and unity, a desire of which he could make use. Louis hoped to fuse his personal interests, that is those of the new Dutch monarchy, with the general interests of his subjects. He therefore consistently presented himself as the *Majesté nationale*, a title he regarded as 'the most beautiful and the most appropriate'.¹⁴

Because the Kingdom of Holland found itself in a constitutional vacuum—the old constitution was not geared to the monarchy and the new constitution was still in the making—royal power knew relatively few bounds. During the rewriting of the constitution, Louis himself took over executive power, in piecemeal fashion.¹⁵ In a short period of time, the Netherlands received a new set of constitutional laws that promised a very authoritarian monarchy. Louis had control over the administration, made the legislature dependent upon him, juggled ministerial positions and created new royal administrative bodies at will.

Among his first acts as King of Holland, Louis opened an inquiry into the codification of Dutch law. He instructed the legal expert, Joannes van der Linden, to formulate a civil code. Van der Linden's approach was original; he was the first to compose a civil code designed explicitly for the new centralized Dutch state, which was also partly based upon customary law. Napoleon intervened, however, for an original Dutch civil code could undermine the allegiance of his brother's people to the French Empire. 'A nation of 1,800,000 souls cannot have a separate legal system', Napoleon claimed.¹⁶ Instead, Louis appointed a commission to arrange a Dutch translation of the Code Napoléon. Rather than just translating the Code Napoléon from French, however, it came up with a number of significant changes. The commission felt that the Code Napoléon did not meet Dutch requirements

as it was written in a foreign language, was not grounded in local circumstances and it conflicted with Dutch conventions.¹⁷ The outcome was a civil code that was a fusion of the French and Dutch legislation which repealed all local regulations and customs. It would remain in force until the French Incorporation in 1810. Under Louis, Holland also received an original Dutch penal code, very close to earlier Batavian projects, which came into force early in 1809.¹⁸

The rewriting of the Code Napoléon is typical of the reign of Louis Bonaparte. He wanted to modernize the Dutch state in a French style, but without neglecting tradition. His administration was modelled on the Napoleonic state, but retained many Dutch features.¹⁹ Similarly, the administrators of the Kingdom of Holland worked on their own versions of the Institute and the Imperial University. Just like the previous regimes, the Kingdom of Holland offered a middle way between new reforms on the model of the Napoleonic Empire and older Dutch traditions.²⁰

Incorporation (1810–13): the incomplete police state

Dissatisfied with his brother's obstinate stance against his demands, Napoleon used the British invasion of the southern island of Walcheren in 1809 as a pretext to incorporate the Kingdom of Holland into the Empire in 1810. Napoleon presented the Incorporation as something inevitable; the Netherlands were simply too small to survive in the world of great power politics. The 'adoption', as Napoleon euphemistically called the Incorporation, was essentially a compassionate act in his eyes. There was surprisingly little Dutch resistance to the loss of independence and a large part of the elite supported the Incorporation, or at least thought it inevitable. The diplomat Anton Reinhardt Falck felt an immediate incorporation by France would 'be better for most of the nation than another temporary or intermediary administration'.²¹ The Incorporation was seen by Dutch administrators, such as the lawyer Cornelis van Maanen, as a chance finally to establish the uniform legal system he had been striving for since the outbreak of the Batavian Revolution in 1795.

The period of the Incorporation presents a break with the norms of the earlier Napoleonic regimes, all of which sought to find a *juste milieu* (the right balance) between historic tradition and revolutionary reform. In civil administration, the legal system and policing, Napoleonic institutions were ruthlessly introduced. Napoleon ignored suggestions made by the Conseil pour les affaires de Hollande, a committee of thirty Dutch notables that was sent to Paris to facilitate the Incorporation of the Dutch provinces into the Empire.²² In the organic decree of 18 October 1810, the general contours of administration in the Dutch departments were laid down. At the top stood the Governor-General, who was to be the eyes and the ears of the Emperor in the Netherlands; Charles-François Lebrun, an administrative veteran

who had also overseen the incorporation of the Ligurian Republic into the Empire in 1806. Together with six senior civil servants, the Governor-General formed the General Administration which was to function as an intermediary between the Dutch departments and the central government in Paris.

At the departmental and local levels, a system of civil administration was established consisting of prefects, sub-prefects and mayors. A uniform system of administration, controlled by the Parisian Ministry of the Interior and the General Government, was now in place, reaching into the smallest and most peripheral towns of the Dutch departments. Although its implementation was far from perfect, this new administrative hierarchy greatly enlarged the control of the central government over its subjects. The traditional administrative culture of collegial government, which had to a certain extent survived under the previous regimes, was now replaced by the French system of centralized government at every level of the administration.

A wholly new legal system was also installed. On 1 March 1811, the hybrid *Wetboek Napoleon* was replaced by the *Code Napoléon*, since Napoleon wanted a uniform legal system throughout the Empire.²³ Following the introduction of the *Code Napoléon*, the public registration of births, deaths, and marriages was introduced. Its purpose was to facilitate taxation and conscription. In general, all this represented an attempt by the Napoleonic state to increase its control over the subject population. The power of the state was also enlarged by the systematic collection of information and the gathering of statistics on the Dutch population by the imperial administrators.

Importantly, the Incorporation ended the long debate in the Netherlands on the establishment of a uniform organization of legal institutions. Just as with the civil administration, a hierarchical and uniform court system was introduced. At the lowest level, justices of the peace were established in each canton. A law court was established for each *arrondissement*, the subdivision of the department. At the top of the legal pyramid in the Dutch departments was the Imperial Court in The Hague, chaired by its president, Cornelis Felix van Maanen. The legal officials of the old Dutch republic, such as the aldermen and the sheriffs, were abolished and replaced by new administrators on the Napoleonic model. Judges were usually chosen by Van Maanen from among the old Dutch legal elite. The public prosecutors, however, were selected by a Belgian, Beyts, and were often Belgian or French. The particularistic and multiform legal tradition of the old republic, was now replaced by a uniform system on the imperial model. Legally, the *ancien régime* had ended.²⁴

Another aspect of the new regime of the Incorporation period was the creation of a modern police force, replacing the traditional urban model. The new police organization was also much larger than before. In this way the Ministry of Police in Paris had direct access to every Dutch town, greatly increasing the control of the central government over law and

order—something unprecedented in history.²⁵ Typical ancien régime institutions were replaced by professional gendarmes and *agents de police*. The wholly new figure of the *commissaire* entered Dutch policing. This official was the core of a political police, concerned with political crimes. Besides the ordinary police force, Holland counted 127 Gendarmerie brigades scattered over the country, each consisting of five to ten soldiers. In times of need, the military Gendarmerie was called upon by the authorities, making it a swift, loyal and feared apparatus of repression.²⁶ One pamphleteer would later describe the general climate of suspicion and fear in the period 1810–13 as follows: ‘the sister would denounce her brother, the son his father and friends suspected each other of being a traitor’.²⁷

Although the Incorporation presented a radical breach with the age old particularistic republican tradition of administration, the legal system and the police, in many other ways state formation in the period 1810–13 was a failure. To a large extent, the cultural and educational institutions of the old Dutch regime survived under the Incorporation, and even the implementation of the Napoleonic legal and police apparatus was not flawless. Many French institutions that were introduced suffered from a constant lack of resources.²⁸ A total failure, furthermore, was Napoleon’s policy of nation building. Napoleon’s attempt to fuse the Dutch with ‘the Great Nation’, for instance through marriages between French officers and the daughters of the Dutch elite, was not successful. Quite the reverse, for the experience of the Incorporation actually reinforced Dutch national consciousness.²⁹

The failure of Napoleon’s reforms must to a large extent be explained by the short duration and the timing of incorporation into the Empire. From 1812 the overstretched Empire came under increasing pressure from the armies of the Fourth Coalition. Some Napoleonic officials like Lebrun and the Intendant for the interior, François, Baron d’Alphonse, genuinely tried to establish an enlightened administration in the interests of the local Dutch population, as well as serving their imperial master. Other French officials regarded the Netherlands merely as a conquered country, whose only purpose was to provide as many men and materials for the Grande Armée as could possibly be squeezed out of the impoverished population.

The first and foremost task of the Napoleonic prefect was enforcing conscription. The oppressive character of the regime met with increasing opposition from the Dutch population, which had initially remained quiescent over the loss of independence. The protest started among the lower social strata of the population against the increased taxes, the regulations against smuggling and conscription. When on 1 April 1813, the sons of the Dutch notables were forced to become *gardes des honneurs* in France to guarantee the loyalty of their fathers, the compliant Dutch political elite became increasingly hostile to the Napoleonic regime. As a result of the demands of war and the short period of the Incorporation, the process of creating a

new and uniform regime was not completed when imperial rule collapsed in November in 1813. Paradoxically, the Napoleonic project would, in many ways, only be achieved after Napoleon's fall.

Restoration (1813–30): the nationalization of the Napoleonic heritage

Joseph Fouché famously said of the restored French monarch, Louis XVIII, that he slept in the bed of Napoleon, implying that he took over the institutions of the Napoleonic state instead of restoring the ancien régime as the term Restoration might suggest. This is equally true of King William I, the son of the last Stadtholder, who had no intention of going back to the old regime. The powerful instruments of the Napoleonic state were far too useful for him to dismantle. In many ways, the incomplete police state of the Incorporation years was brought to completion during the Restoration. Not only were the institutions of the Napoleonic state retained and further developed by the Restoration, as was most of its personnel.³⁰

This does not imply that the regime change of 1813–15 had no effect on the administration. The Council of State, the pinnacle of the Napoleonic administrative system, for instance, diminished in importance under the Restoration. By contrast, the role of the Secretary of State grew enormously after 1813, as it was the ideal, obedient vehicle for the authoritarian objectives of King William. The Napoleonic legacy was nationalized under the Restoration, and the institutions of the newly centralized state were given traditional names suggesting continuity with Dutch tradition. The legislative assembly of the restored monarchy, for instance, was called Estates-General, although this institution had hardly anything in common with its ancien régime namesake. The Council of State, a Napoleonic institutional innovation, was given the historic medieval name of *Raad van State*.

Although William's monarchy was in many respects the heir of the Napoleonic regimes, he far from acknowledged this debt. The recent past was not mentioned by the officials of the Restoration, whether in a negative or a positive sense. Those few reactionaries who demanded retribution for the behaviour of Dutch officials during the Incorporation, were derided as mischief-makers who endangered the stability of the new state.³¹ The post-revolutionary centralized state presented a breach with the federalist and particularistic traditions of the old Dutch republic. After 1813, however, it was increasingly viewed as a system of government that was typically Dutch.

Conclusions: a new regime or a revived order?

In *Napoleon's Integration of Europe*, Stuart Woolf describes 'the gradual emergence of a class of civilian professionals, convinced of the potential of

modern administration and expert in its application' as the most important legacy of the Napoleonic empire.³² The Napoleonic era, according to Woolf, marked the beginning of modern administration, while Isser Woloch sees an increased pervasion of the state in many aspects of society. French civic order in the years 1789–1820, according to Woloch, was transformed into a 'new regime' that was radically different from its pre-revolutionary predecessor.³³ However, Michael Rowe, studying the case of the Rhineland, offers a different interpretation. The importance of the Napoleonic age for the Rhineland, according to Rowe, lies not in political modernization and renewal, but in the way the imperial system allowed older political forms to survive and reinforce themselves.³⁴

Rowe's thesis is also true for the Dutch Regency of State of 1801–05. Napoleonic rule ended centuries' old conflicts within the Dutch elite. In a classic case of *fusion* or *ralliement*, Napoleon tried to blend moderate revolutionaries and the moderate Orangists who stood aside from the anti-Orangist Batavian Republic. The fusion of elites is a theme in all regimes before the Restoration of 1814. At the level of institutions, the so-called Staatsbewind meant a partial return to the ancien régime, which had been abolished by the founding of the unitary state by radical revolutionaries in 1798. In other ways, however, the process of state building was continued. The regime change of 1805 reinforced the executive power and consolidated the unitary state, although during Schimmelpenninck's rule, classic republican symbolism had a brief revival. Subsequently, Napoleon placed his brother Louis on the Dutch throne. Louis' reign ended more than two hundred years of republican tradition in the Netherlands.

During the Incorporation, after 1810, Napoleon imposed his centralized model of administration on the Dutch provinces without much ado, establishing an authoritarian police state. The administrative innovations were facilitated by the collaboration of many Dutch administrators at all levels of the imperial administration, who regarded the incorporation as a unique chance to implement institutional reform and break the resilience of the old institutions. The Napoleonic period, however, was too short and the Empire was already under too much stress, to complete all these reforms. In many ways, the Napoleonic project was fulfilled after his fall. The restored Prince of Orange, the new King William I, retained most elements of the centralized state and many Napoleonic administrators. The Napoleonic origins of the new state were, however, officially forgotten. In short, the new Dutch state resembled a modern new regime, along the lines outlined by Woolf and Woloch but, just as in the Rhineland, the Napoleonic era also consolidated and revitalized many political and social structures of the old regime. Therefore, we can conclude that the Napoleonic legacy in the Netherlands, was in fact a new regime disguised as a revived order.

Notes

1. N. C. F. van Sas, *De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar moderniteit, 1750–1900* (Amsterdam, 2004), 345.
2. Simon Schama, *Patriots and Liberators. Revolution in the Netherlands 1780–1813* (London, 1977).
3. E.g. Michael Broers, *Europe Under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996). Michael Rowe, *From Reich to State. The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780–1830* (Cambridge, 2003). Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's integration of Europe* (London, 1991).
4. Annie Jourdan, 'Le rôle des agents français dans la constitution batave de 1798', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 351 (2008), 99–119.
5. See for literature on the Regency of State in English: Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 410–465.
6. W. R. E. Velema, 'Revolutie, republiek en revolutie. De ideologische context van de eerste Nederlandse grondwet', in *De eeuw van de grondwet. Grondwet en politiek in Nederland, 1798–1917*, ed. N.C.F. van Sas and H. te Velde (Deventer 1998), 20–44.
7. Hendrik Boels, *Binnenlandse Zaken. Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van een département in de Bataafse tijd, 1795–1806: een reconstructie* (Den Haag, 1993), 349.
8. L. de Gou, *De Staatsregeling van 1805 en de Constitutie van 1806* (Den Haag, 1997), XIX.
9. Renger de Bruin, 'De opbouw van een nieuwe staat. Bestuurlijk-politieke veranderingen tussen 1780 en 1815', in *Het ontstaan van het moderne Nederland: staats- en natievorming tussen 1780 en 1830*, ed. Wantje Fritschy and Joop Toebes (Nijmegen, 1996), 123–156, 149. H.T. Colenbrander, *Schimmelpenninck en Koning Lodewijk* (Amsterdam, 1911), 30–37.
10. Martijn van der Burg, 'L'école primaire dans le royaume de Hollande et durant l'annexion à la France', in *Louis Bonaparte, roi de Hollande*, ed. Annie Jourdan (Paris, 2010), 185–197.
11. Archives nationales Paris, AFIV 1820, 5. Louis Bonaparte, *Documents historiques et réflexions sur le gouvernement de la Hollande*, vol. I (Bruxelles, 1820), 68–69.
12. J. M. Kemper, *Brieven over de tegenwoordig in omloop zijnde geruchten* (Amsterdam 1806), 13.
13. Martijn van der Burg, 'Transforming the Dutch Republic into the Kingdom of Holland', *European Review of History* (2010) forthcoming.
14. Louis Bonaparte, *Documents historiques*, vol. I, 141–142.
15. De Gou, *De Staatsregeling*, 309.
16. Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 700.
17. A.H. Huussen, *Huwelijks- en huwelijksgoederenrecht tot 1820* (Bussum, 1975), 313–314.
18. Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 543.
19. J. Roelevink, 'Cette grande inertie qu'on rencontre sans cesse dans la marche des affaires. Lodewijk als wetgever en uitvoerder', *De Negentiende eeuw*, 30 (2006), 177–191.
20. Martijn van der Burg, *Nederland onder Franse invloed. Culturele overdracht en staatsvorming in de napoleontische tijd, 1799–1813* (Amsterdam, 2009). See also: Martijn van der Burg, 'Transferts culturels franco-bataves à l'époque napoléonienne', <http://geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net/forum/id=1009&type=artikel>.
21. J. Naber, *Overheersing en vrijwording. Geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Inlijving bij Frankrijk* (Haarlem, 1913), 23–24.

22. Marie Elisabeth Kluit, *Cornelis Felix van Maanen. Tot het herstel der onafhankelijkheid* (Groningen, 1953), chapter 7.
23. Van der Burg, *Nederland onder Franse invloed*, 94.
24. Johan Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam. Onrust, opruiing en onwilligheid in Nederland ten tijde van het Koninkrijk Holland en de Inlijving bij het Franse Keizerrijk (1806–1813)*, (Amsterdam, 2000), 582–586.
25. Martijn van der Burg, 'Law Enforcement in Amsterdam: between Tradition and Modernization', in *Serving the Urban Community. The Rise of Public Facilities in the Low Countries*, ed. Manon van der Heijden et al. (Amsterdam, 2009), 217–241, 235.
26. Joor, *De Adelaar en het Lam*, 639–641.
27. *Schets der gevolgen van den invloed der Franschen op Nederland sedert het jaar 1795* (Amsterdam, 1814), 18.
28. This goes especially for the French *Université impériale*. See Van der Burg, *Nederland onder Franse invloed*, chapter 6 and 'Transferts culturels franco-bataves'. See also Chapter 8 in this volume Johan Joor, 'Resistance against Napoleon in the kingdom of Holland'.
29. Van Sas, *Metamorfose*, 87–89.
30. Matthijs Lok, *Windvanen. Napoleontische bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse Restauratie, 1813–1820* (Amsterdam, 2009). Idem, 'L'extrême centre est-il exportable? Une comparaison entre la France et les Pays-Bas, 1814–1820', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 3 (2009): 147–163.
31. Jeroen van Zanten, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard. politieke discussie en oppositievorming 1813–1840* (Amsterdam, 2004).
32. Woolf, *Napoleon's integration of Europe*, 69.
33. Isser Woloch, *The New Regime. Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820s* (New York, 1994), 429.
34. Rowe, *From Reich to State*, 8.

Timeline Dutch History

1588-1795:	Dutch Republic/United Provinces
1795-1806:	Batavian Republic
1806-1810:	Kingdom of Holland
1810-1813:	Part of Napoleonic France
1813/14-1830/9:	United Kingdom of the Netherlands
1830/9-present:	Kingdom of the Netherlands